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RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE TRANSFER OF STOCK* 
Francis T. Christyt 
D URING the past few years there have been increasing efforts on the part of a number of organized groups to establish statutory 
definitions of the responsibilities of corporations and their transfer 
agents in the transfer of stock. Among these groups are the Commission 
on Uniform State Laws, which sponsored the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which have jointly produced 
the new Uniform Commercial Code, the Committee on Simplification 
of Security Transfers of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 
Section of the American Bar Association, of which Committee I am 
a member, the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association, the 
New York Stock Transfer Association, some stock exchanges, and 
special committees representing a number of local bar associations. The 
efforts in this direction stem largely from the annoyance that is often 
caused by the rules laid down by transfer agents to govern transfers of 
stock other than normal transfers by individuals in their own right. 
These transfers are generally called "fiduciary transfers." 
Most transfer agents (and when I speak of "transfer agents" I in-
clude both professional transfer agents and corporations which transfer 
their own stock) have taken little part and have displayed little inter-
est in this movement. There are a number of reasons for this. One is 
that the practice of transferring stock has been well developed over the 
years and the transfer clerks have been thoroughly trained to follow 
such practice. Another reason is that the Rules of the New York Stock 
Transfer Association, the membership of which includes the large 
banks and corporations all over the country and Canada, have become 
so well established and recognized that they have almost the force of 
law. A third reason is that most of the so-called "exoneration statutes" 
adopted or proposed to date are so badly conceived, and present so many 
problems, that they offer danger rather than safety to the transfer agents. 
A further reason is that many transfer agents now carry insurance 
protecting them against claims arising from improper transfers of stock, 
so that they are not vitally interested in securing statutory protection. 
* The text of this article was originally delivered as an address to the Banking Law 
Section of the New York State Bar Association on January 27, 1955. An abridged version 
will appear in a forthcoming issue of Trusts and Estates.-Ed. 
t Member, New York Bar.-Ed. 
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They are, of course, interested from a public relations standpoint in 
simplifying the transfer of stock, but no one has yet devised a method 
whereby they can do this with propriety and safety. They cannot just 
ignore the usual requirements in the case of fiduciary transfers and rely 
on their insurance, as the insurance companies expect them to use 
_the degree of care established by law in making transfers. 
In order to understand the responsibilities in transferring stock 
it is necessary to review, briefly, some ancient history.· The cause of the 
confused thinking as to the duty and responsibility of a transfer agent, 
which persists to this day, can be traced back to an unfortunate remark 
by Judge Taney in Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers Trust Company1 
decided in 1848. Judge Taney said that a corporation is "the custodian 
of the shares of stock, and clothed with power sufficient to protect the 
rights of every one interested, from unauthorized transfers; it is a trust 
placed in the hands of the corporation for the protection of individual 
interests, and like every other trustee, it is bound to execute the trust 
with proper diligence and care, and is responsible for any injury sus-
tained by its negligence or misconduct." By this remark, Judge Taney 
rejected the English theory, which had been developed a number of 
years earlier, that a corporation was not bound to notice trusts of its 
stock and could look solely to the legal estate.2 An outstanding author-
ity on the law of trusts, Professor Austin W. Scott of Harvard Law 
School, has condemned the view expressed by Judge Taney and the 
American courts: 
"In the United States it has been held that where the name of 
the holder of shares of stock or other corporate securities as registered 
on the books of the corporation, is followed by the word 'trustee' 
or other words indicating a fiduciary character, and the holder 
transfers the securities in breach of trust, the corporation is liable 
for participation in the breach of trust if it registers the transfer 
without making inquiry as to the extent of the powers of the trus-
tee, if such inquiry would have disclosed the breach of trust. The 
effect of this doctrine, which has never prevailed in England, is to 
put upon the corporation responsibility for preventing breaches of 
trust. But it seems absurd to compel the transfer agent of a cor-
poration to determine the different questions which may arise as 
to the powers of a trustee. The effect is seriously to obstruct the 
administration of trusts and to increase the expenses of adminis-
tration. "3 
1 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 at 1047, No. 8,581 (C.C. Md. 1848). . 
2 Hartga v. The Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jr. 55, 30 Eng. Rep. 891 (1796). 
3 Scott, "Participation in a Breach of Trust," 34 HARv. L. REv. 454 at 465-466 (1921). 
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During the flourishing growth of the corporate business form fol-
lowing the Lowry case and up to the early 1920' s when the practice of 
transferring stock became more or less standardized, there were many 
instances of litigation involving stock transfers.4 No clear pattern of 
responsibility on the part of the transfer agent appeared in these cases. 
Many courts went to extremes to impose onerous duties on the transfer 
agent,5 which gave rise, necessarily, to the imposition of requirements 
Qften considered harsh and unnecessary by an honest fiduciary attempt-
ing to transfer stock belonging to his estate. It is significant, however, 
that during the past twenty-five or thirty years there has been little 
litigation in this field. This is due mainly to three things. The first 
is that the practice of transferring stock and the requirements for trans-
fer have become standardized and are better understood. 6 The second 
is the clarification by stock exchanges, brokers and transfer agents of 
the effect of the signature guaranty. 7 The third is the modem practice, 
which has become widespread, of holding fiduciary stock in the name 
of a nominee. This nominee practice is now supported by statutory 
authority in over thirty states.8 
However, the old cases exist as a body of law defining the responsi-
bilities in transferring stock, and the transfer agent must necessarily 
impose the historic requirements for transfer in order to protect itself. 
There are only two ways in which this situation can be corrected 
and brought into line with modem business practice. A decision by an 
4 See collection of cases in CHRISTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 
p. 6, n. 8 (1940). 
5 Most of the decisions in themselves were quite proper but the general language used 
by the courts in their opinions was so broad that it gave waming to transfer agents of 
possible liability in other types of transfer. For instance, see Wooten v. Wilmington & 
W.R. Co., 128 N.C. 119 at 127, 38 S.E. 298 (1901). Compare this with the statement 
of the court in Peck v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R.I. 275 at 284, 21 A. 543 (1891): 
"Ordinary diligence, and not suspicious watchfulness, is the measure of duty which a 
corporation owes to its stockholders •..• " 
6 Standardization has been promoted by Rulings of the Standardization Committee of 
the New York Stock Transfer Association, which are generally followed by the members 
of the association. Increased understanding has come from the publication of loose-leaf 
services on stock transfers by Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall. Prior to the 
publication of the first edition of CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER oF STOCK (1929), the only 
textbook on the subject was LOWELL AND LoWELL, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK IN PRIVATE 
CoRPORATIONS (1884). 
7 Rule No. 198 of the New York Stock Exchange reads "An endorsement or guarantee 
of an assignment or a power of substitution shall be a guarantee of the signature to such 
assignment or power of substitution and shall also be a guarantee of the legal capacity and 
authority of the signer." Rule No. SR-48 of the American Stock Exchange is the same. See 
THE SIGNATURE GUARANTY by R. B. Tuttle, Jr. of The Bank of New York (a thesis 
submitted to the Graduate School of Banking conducted by the American Bankers Asso-
ciation at Rutgers University, June 1953). 
8 The statutes are cited in CHRISTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 
§74a (1940; Supp. 1954). 
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authoritative court (probably it would have to be the Supreme Court 
of the United States) defining the duties and responsibilities of a 
transfer agent would, of course, replace the old body of law and give 
the transfer agents a reason for modernizing their requirements. It is 
not likely, however, that such a decision could be secured. The other 
way is the widespread adoption of a uniform and practical statutory 
definition of the responsibility of a transfer agent in making fiduciary 
f I th d " ·d d " " ·f " d trans ers. want to stress e wor s WI esprea , uni orm an 
"practical" for reasons which will appear later. Parenthetically, I 
might explain that I am calling such a statutory definition an "exonera-
tion statute" because that is the term popularly used, although it is not 
a very good one from the standpoint of accurately describing the sub-
ject matter. 
Two other suggestions have been made for simplifying fiduciary 
transfers. One is the extension of the use of the so-called "Standard 
Indemnity Agreement," which is given by a bank or trust company 
acting as fiduciary to the transfer agent in lieu of the usual documents 
to support the transfer.9 This would not help the individual fiduciary, 
whose agreement would not be accepted by the transfer agent. The 
other suggestion is some form of cheap insurance which could be pur-
chased by the fiduciary and offered to the transfer agent in lieu of 
documents. This is shortly to be considered by the Court and Judicial 
Bond Advisory Committee of the Surety Association of America.10 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the statutory attempts to define 
the responsibility of a transfer agent, it is advisable to get clearly in 
mind that there are two fundamental types of responsibility. The 
failure of many lawyers and legislators to grasp the distinction between 
these two types is surprising and is one reason why some of the statutes 
heretofore adopted are useless and, indeed, dangerous. The first type 
is responsibility for an unauthorized and void transfer, , hereinafter 
called a "wrongful transfer," and the second type is responsibility for 
a transfer by a fiduciary in breach of his trust which is voidable by the 
beneficiary, hereinafter called a "transfer in breach of trust." 
9 The Standard Indemnity Agreement reads as follows: "The undersigned Bank 
requests that this transfer be made without its furnishing supporting documents, and war-
rants the propriety of such transfer and agrees, in any case where the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act does not or may not afford full protection for such transfer, fully to indemnify and hold 
harmless the corporation and its transfer agent for any loss or cost, including counsel fees, 
which either may suffer by reason thereof." 
10 Under the English Forged Transfers Act of 1891, 54 and 55 Viet., c. 43, a company 
may charge a fee not exceeding one shilling per one hundred pounds on transfers in order 
to provide a fund to meet any claims arising from forged transfers. 
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The primary example of a wrongful transfer is, of course, a transfer 
on a forged indorsement. Other examples are transfers by a corporate 
officer or by an agent without authority, by a fiduciary who has not been 
legally appointed or who has been removed and who indorses the stock 
in the name of a decedent, or a minor or an incompetent, or by a fidu-
ciary without obtaining a court order where a transfer without court 
order is void.11 These examples are to be compared with transfers by 
a fiduciary which are not in the regular course of administration of the 
estate or in accordance with the terms of the trust. The latter are 
transfers in breach of trust and may be attacked by the beneficiary or 
by a successor fiduciary as voidable transfers.12 
No one quarrels much with the requirements imposed by a transfer 
agent to protect itself against wrongful transfers, such as a signature 
guaranty, a certified copy of a corporate resolution, evidence of the 
appointment of the fiduciary, and a court order where it is necessary for 
the validity of the transfer. The quarrel comes when the transfer agent 
asks to look at the will or the trust instrument and then requires an 
executor to prove that the debts of the estate have been paid or that 
the transfer is by way of sale of the shares or that the transferee is a 
legatee; or requires a trustee to prove that he has a power of sale, or 
that the life tenant is dead, where the transferee is a remainderman, or 
that the transferee has reached the age when distribution to him is 
directed by the trust instrument; or requires a guardian to prove that 
his ward has reached majority, where the transfer is to the ward; or 
requires any fiduciary to prove that a transfer to his individual name is 
proper. But, under existing law, the transfer agent must look at such 
papers and must require such proof. To eliminate this duty of a 
transfer agent is not unfair to the beneficial owner of the stock. The 
fiduciary was selected by the person creating the fiduciary relationship, 
and the transfer agent should not have to be a watchdog to keep him 
honest. 
Attempted Statutory Solutions 
England. The difference between a wrongful transfer and a trans-
fer in breach of trust has always been recognized in England. As long 
ago as 1845 the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act contained a 
provision to the effect that "the company shall not be bound to see to 
the execution of any trust, whether express, implied, or constructive, 
11 See cases cited in CmusTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., §243 
(1940). 
12 Id., §256. 
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to which any of the said shares may be subject .... "13 A substantially 
similar provision reading, "No notice of any trust, expressed, implied 
or constructive, shall be entered on the register, or be receivable by the 
registrar, in the case of companies registered in England," appears in 
the Companies Acts,1 4 and it has been the practice to incorporate the 
same provision in the charters of English companies. Canada and its 
provinces follow the English practice and have similar statutes.15 There 
is also a statute of similar import in Massachusetts, and, at one time, 
there were such statutes in Pennsylvania and Illinois.16 
Although the English type statute has merit in that it strikes at 
the true evil to be corrected, namely, responsibility for transfers in 
breach of trust, it is too broad in language to suit the American practice 
where statutes are supposed to spell out the subject matter in consider-
able detail. This devotion to detail has been the ruination of some of 
the American statutes which have tried to define the responsibilities of 
a transfer agent. 
Fiduciaries Act. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act.17 made a good start 
in trying to adapt the English type statute to the American practice with 
a minimum of detail. Section 3 of this act provides, in substance, that 
a transfer agent in transferring stock registered in the name of a :fidu-
ciary is not bound to inquire whether the :fiduciary is committing a 
breach of trust and is not liable for registering such a transfer unless 
it has actual knowledge that a breach of trust is being committed. The 
major weakness of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is that it is limited to 
the case where the stock is registered in the name of the :fiduciary, thus 
eliminating cases where the stock is registered in the name of the person 
for whom the :fiduciary is acting in indorsing and transferring the stock, 
such as a decedent or a ward. According to a commentary by the 
draftsmen of the act, this limitation was used to avoid interference with 
the waiver provisions of inheritance tax statutes. The limitation could 
13 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 and 9 Viet., c. 16, §20. 
14Companies Act of 1948, 11 and 12 Geo. VI, c. 38, §117. This provision appeared 
also in the Companies Acts of 1908 and 1929. 
15 The statutes are cited in CHRISTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OP STOCK, 2d 
ed., §224 (1940). 
16 The Pennsylvania statute [Pa. Stat. Ann. (1933) tit. 20, §3151] was the earliest 
(1874) American exoneration act. The Illinois statute appeared in ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 
1929) c. 32, 1[29. Both statutes were superseded by §3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 20, §3351; ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 98, §236. The 
Massachusetts statute is discussed on p. 709 infra. 
17 9A ULA. There are a number of states in which only §3 and not the whole act 
has been adopted. As used herein, Uniform Fiduciaries Act is deemed to include the 
statutes which are limited to §3. 
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have been avoided, however, by an express provision that the require-
ments of inheritance tax statutes would not be affected by the act. The 
wording of the act also technically bars from the benefit of the statutes 
stock standing in the name of a person known by the transfer agent to 
be a nominee, but this has been corrected in a number of states by 
amending the act to include stock registered in the name of a nominee 
of the fiduciary. 
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act or statutes similar to section 3 of the 
act have now been adopted in thirty jurisdictions.18 In one state, 
New York, an attempt has been made to correct the defect in the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act above mentioned, namely, that it is limited 
to cases where the stock is registered in the name of the fiduciary. 
When section 3 of the act was adopted in New York in 1937, an addi-
tional section was added providing, in substance, that a transfer by an 
acting fiduciary of stock in the name of a decedent or a minor or a ward 
or an incompetent or a deceased or discharged fiduciary imposed no 
duty on the transfer agent to inquire whether the fiduciary was com-
mitting a breach of trust or to see to the performance of the fiduciary 
obligation, and that a transfer agent would not be liable for any such 
transfer unless it had actual knowledge of a breach of trust or knowl-
edge of such facts as to make its action in transferring the stock amount 
to bad faith.19 
There are two points of importance in the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act as adopted in New York. One is that the transfer agent is relieved 
expressly of the duty to inquire as to the nature of a transfer by a fidu-
ciary. This means that the transfer agent does not have to examine 
wills or trust instruments, although it does, of course, have to satisfy 
itself that the fiduciary is the proper person to assign the stock. 
The second point of importance is that the transfer agent is held 
liable only where it has actual knowledge that the fiduciary is com-
mitting a breach of trust or has knowledge of such facts that its action 
amounts to bad faith. This means that knowledge only that the 
transfer may or may not be a breach of trust, such as a transfer to the 
individual name of the fiduciary, would not be enough to make the 
transfer agent liable if it turned out that the transfer was a breach of 
trust. There has been some criticism of this provision, however, in that 
it does not go far enough and that a recorded will or trust instrument 
18 The citations appear in CmusTY .AND McLEAN, THI! TRANSFER OP STOCK, 2d ed., 
§225 (1940; Supp. 1954). 
19 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1941) §359-k. 
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might be held to give actual lrnowledge. This argument seems to be 
rather far-fetched, as a transfer agent could not be expected to search 
the records at the domicile of the :fiduciary. The argument could be 
overcome by a clause similar to the clause in the Massachusetts statute 
that actual lrnowledge is not given by a recorded instrument. 
Uniform reliance on these two points in the act would do away 
with a good deal of the annoyance involved in :fiduciary transfers of 
stock. If this is so, then why don't transfer agents rely on the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act? One answer is that the act, except in the form adopted 
in New York, is not complete in that it is restricted to cases where the 
stock stands in the name of the :fiduciary or a nominee. Another is that 
it has not yet been adopted in enough jurisdictions. It can be relied 
upon safely only where it has been adopted in every jurisdiction in 
which a claim might be made by the beneficiary-the domicile of the 
corporation, the domicile of the transfer agent, and, possibly, the situs 
of the trust or :fiduciary relationship. 
Ohio. A number of states have adopted special exoneration statutes 
which do not fall into any uniform pattern. The best of these is in 
Ohio, where the defining of the responsibilities of a transfer agent has 
been the subject of considerable study for a number of years by legis-
lative commissions and the bar associations. The :first Ohio statute was 
based on the English law and provided that, if stock should be regis-
tered in the name of a :fiduciary, the transfer agent could treat the :fidu-
ciary as the unqualified owner for all purposes and would not be bound 
to recognize any equitable interest in the shares or to see to the execu-
tion of any trust or obligation.20 This was superseded by a new statute 
in 194921 which went into much more detail. In addition to incorpo-
rating the substance of the old statute, the new statute provides that a 
transfer agent incurs no liability for a :fiduciary transfer where it secures 
proof, satisfactory to it, of the appointment and qualification of the 
:fiduciary. The statute also includes a few frills, such as a provision 
that when a corporation treats a minor as entitled to exercise any rights 
of ownership no subsequent avoidance of the transaction by the minor 
shall be effective against the corporation. According to the statute, 
participation by the transfer agent in a breach of trust makes the transfer 
agent liable only where it acts in bad faith. 
California. In California there is a statute to the effect that a 
:fiduciary is presumed to have the power to accept and transfer stock, 
20 Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1948) §8623-33. 
21Qhio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §1701.38. 
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and the transfer agent is under no duty to inquire into any trust or 
other document or appointment under which the fiduciary is acting, 
or whether the £.duciary is committing a breach of trust or exceeding 
his authority.22 The liability of a transfer agent for a breach of trust 
is limited to where it has actual knowledge of the breach or of the 
invalidity of the trust or other document or appointment under which 
the fiduciary is acting. 
Massachusetts. A short statute in Massachusetts provides that a 
transfer agent is not bound to see to the execution of any trust to which 
any shares are subject, or to ascertain or inquire whether the trust 
authorizes a transfer by the holder of the shares.23 The statute imposes 
a liability where the transfer agent had actual knowledge of the breach 
of trust, but the fact that the trust is of record does not constitute such 
actual knowledge. It is the practice of some Boston transfer agents to 
rely on this statute in certain cases. 
Wisconsin. The most recent of the non-uniform acts is the statute 
adopted in Wisconsin in 195324 at the instance of the joint committee 
on revision of the Wisconsin corporation laws appointed by the State 
and Milwaukee Bar Associations. The Wisconsin act goes into more 
detail than the other statutes. It specifies six cases in which a transfer 
agent is not bound to make inquiry and is not to be held liable for lack 
of power, authority or capacity of the person indorsing the stock or for 
unrightfulness of the transfer. These six cases are (a) indorsements 
by an executor, administrator or testamentary or other trustee if proof 
is furnished that the signer was such at the date of signing; (b) indorse-
ments by a guardian, conservator, receiver or other successor to, or 
custodian of, the interest of any person by operation of law if proof is 
furnished that the signer had been appointed as such by a court and 
was such at the date of signing; (c) indorsements by a nominee of a 
fiduciary or other person where the stock is registered in the name of 
such nominee; (d) indorsements by an incompetent unless the transfer 
agent has actual knowledge that the signer is under adjudication of 
incompetence or under guardianship; (e) indorsements by an infant 
unless the transfer agent has actual knowledge that he is under guard-
ianship, and (f) indorsements by a surviving joint tenant if proof is 
furnished that the other joint tenant is dead. 
22 Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 1953) §2411. 
23 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 203, §21. 
24 Wis. Stat. (1953) §180.85. 
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The main trouble with the Wisconsin act is that it requires proof 
that a £duciary indorser was the fiduciary at the date of his indorsement. 
From the practical standpoint, this means, for instance, that the fidu-
ciary and the transfer agent would have to make sure that the date on 
a surrogate's certificate showing the appointment of an executor or 
administrator and the date of the indorsement were one and the same-
the protection of the statute would be lost if there was any variance in 
the dates. From the legal standpoint, the date of indorsement has little 
importance, as the indorsement is ineffectual until the stock is deliv-
ered, and the transfer can be a rightful one, insofar as the authority of 
the fiduciary to make the transfer is concerned, only if the indorser is 
the fiduciary at the date of delivery as well as at the date of signing. 
It is quite possible, if not probable, that an executor, upon being ap-
pointed, would get a supply of surrogate's certificates and then indorse 
all of the stock certificates in the estate as of the date of the surrogate's 
certificates, but it might be months before he made any delivery or 
before the stock was presented to the transfer agent for transfer. If the 
executor should be a bad actor and should be removed by the surrogate, 
he could, after his removal, sell the stock and deliver the certificates, 
accompanied by one of the old surrogate's certificates, to a purchaser, 
who could then present them to the transfer agent. The transfer agent, 
noting that the date of indorsement and the date of the surrogate's 
certificate were the same would properly transfer the stock in reliance 
on the statute, unless, of course, it had knowledge that the old executor 
had been removed. It would be useless to try to change the wording of 
the act to require proof that a fiduciary was the fiduciary at the date of 
delivery, because the transfer agent would then have to secure evidence 
as to the date of delivery, which could only be a self-serving statement 
by the fiduciary or the transferee. 
Another defect in the Wisconsin act is that it requires proof that a 
testamentary or other trustee was trustee at the date of signing. A cer-
tified copy of the will would, of course, be proof that a testamentary 
trustee was appointed, but how could it be proved, other than by a 
self-serving statement by the trustee, that he was the trustee at the date 
of indorsing the stock, which might be many years after the probate 
of the will? The situation would be even worse for a trustee of an inter 
vivos trust, as he would have to submit the original trust agreement to 
the transfer agent, which no trustee wants to do because of the risk 
of losing the agreement. A copy certified by a bank might not be con-
sidered "proof" under the statute. 
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The Wisconsin act also contains a provision which, presumably, 
is an attempt to make the act apply where a corporation may transfer 
stock outside of the state. Such provision is that a corporation acting 
outside the state in connection with the transfer of its stock shall have 
no greater obligation to the holder or owner of any certificate for the 
shares than one acting within the state. Whether or not the attempt 
will be successful seems open to some doubt. 
The Commercial Code 
The latest and most powerful attempt to define the responsibilities 
of a transfer agent by statute is the new Uniform Commercial Code. 
The code, of course, covers a wide range of subjects in addition to 
stock transfers. The relevant provisions are contained in article 8 of 
the code, although there are sections in other articles which are of 
interest to transfer agents and others in the field. 
Unfortunately, the provisions of article 8 of the code reflect little 
knowledge on the part of the draftsmen of the practical aspects of the 
transfer of stock and little effort to consider the views of those who are 
familiar with such practical aspects. The code has been submitted to 
the legislatures of a number of states with a strong drive behind it. It 
has already been adopted in Pennsylvania.25 In New York hearings 
on the code have been held by the Law Revision Commission, and the 
views of some transfer agents as to article 8 have been expressed at such 
hearings. The substance of such views is that article 8 requires some 
rather substantial amendments in order to make it workable. Similar 
views have been expressed by the Subcommittee on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code of the American Bankers Association26 and by the Com-
mittee on Simplification of Security Transfers of the American Bar 
Association.27 The Committee on Uniform State Laws of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York acting jointly with the 
Special Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code of the New York 
State Bar Association recommends further study of the entire code 
before adoption. The soundness of these views is demonstrated by the 
fact that the backers of the code have already appointed a subcommittee 
to consider revision of article 8.28 It is hard to understand why the bugs 
in article 8 were not exterminated before the code was turned loose. 
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A. 
26 Report dated October 17, 1954, p. 68. 
27 A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, SECTION oF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRusT I.Aw, 
Part 1, Probate and Trust Law Divisions, p. 130 (1954). 
28 Some amendments to article 8 are contained in Supplement No. 1 to the Uniform 
Commercial Code issued in January 1955. 
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It may be assumed that groups in states other than New York also 
will want amendments in article 8, which means that, if the code is to 
be amended before passage by various state legislatures, the vital ele-
ment of uniformity will be destroyed. One of the New York transfer 
agents (John C. Bancroft of The Bank of New York), in testifying 
before the Law Revision Commission, said: "New York may adopt 
Article 8 with revisions such as are suggested here; but if each subse-
quent state adopts Article 8 with greater or less revisions, the transfer 
agents will be in a very difficult position in trying to bring together the 
varying wordings of the laws of the different jurisdictions which might 
apply to the particular transfer in question." 
The provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to .the 
responsibilities of a transfer agent in making a transfer of stock are con-
tained in sections 8-401, 8-402 and 8-403. Section 8-401 imposes a 
duty on the transfer agent to make a transfer and relieves the transfer 
agent from liability if (a) the certificate is fully indorsed in conform-
. ity with section 8-402, (b) the transfer agent has no knowledge of the 
unrightfulness of the transfer and no duty to inquire into its rightful-
ness, and (c) inheritance tax waivers are submitted if the stock is in 
the name of a decedent. Note that this section makes it the duty of the 
transfer agent to transfer the stock if these conditions are fuHilled. Does 
this mean that a professional transfer agent in a state which has adopted 
the code must transfer the stock even though the state in which the 
corporation may be domiciled has not adopted the code? For instance, 
under the code a transfer agent could not require a court order for a 
transfer by a guardian even though the law governing the guardianship 
may provide that a transfer by a guardian without court order is void. 
A transfer agent in a code state might be protected in making such a 
transfer, but would the corporation in a non-co'de state be protected 
against a claim by the ward for wrongful transfer? 
Section 8-402 defines sufficiency of indorsement. It states in clause 
(1) that a certificate is fully indorsed for transfer when the indorse-
ment is sufficient to make the person presenting it a holder of the secur-
ity. This seems to assume that it is always the assignee of the certificate 
who presents it for transfer. In fiduciary transfers this is rarely the 
case; the person presenting the stock for transfer is generally the fidu-
ciary or his bank or broker. Furthermore, it might be argued that this 
definition requires the transfer agent to make a transfer without any 
supporting documents, as section 8-401 compels the transfer agent to 
register a transfer if the certificate is "fully indorsed" and it has no 
knowledge of any unrightfulness and no duty to inquire. According 
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to section 8-403, a transfer agent has no duty to inquire unless it has 
notice of another claim to an interest in the stock, and notice of a fidu-
ciary situation does not impose such a duty. 
Clause (2) of section 8-402 provides that, unless the transfer agent 
has notice that the indorser lacks power to indorse, it shall not require 
more than the following evidence to establish the necessary indorse-
ment: 
If the person whose indorsement is required is at the time of 
signing 
(a) an adult not under guardianship, his indorsement and 
a signature guarantee; 
(b) an infant or an adult under guardianship, the indorse-
ment of his guardian, a signature guarantee, and proof that the 
indorser was such guardian at the date of signing; 
(c) a decedent, the indorsement of his executor or adminis-
trator, a signature guarantee, and proof that the indorser was such 
executor or administrator at the date of signing; 
(d) a partnership, the indorsement of a partner or an author-
ized agent, a signature guarantee, and proof that the indorser was 
such partner or agent at the date of signing; 
(e) a corporation, the indorsement of any officer, a signature 
guarantee, and proof that the indorser was such officer at the date 
of signing; 
(f) an executor, administrator, trustee, receiver, or other fidu-
ciary, the indorsement of such fiduciary, a signature guarantee, 
and proof that the indorser was such fiduciary at the date of 
signing; 
(g) a person not covered by any of the foregoing, papers 
appropriate to the case corresponding as nearly as possible to the 
foregoing. 
Date of signing. The first and most obvious defect in clause 
(2) of section 8-402 of the code is that proof must be furnished that 
the person indorsing the certificate as a fiduciary was such fiduciary 
at the date of the indorsement. This defect has been discussed above 
in connection with the Wisconsin statute and it need not be mentioned 
further. The American Law Institute and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have attempted to correct 
this defect by adding a new paragraph providing that, the fact that the 
indorser was the fiduciary at the date of signing may be established by 
an appropriate certificate of appointment or incumbency dated within 
a reasonable period prior to the date of presentation.29 This would appear 
29 See Supplement No. 1 to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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to be a patch-up job which might encourage further patch-up amend-
ments so that in the final result article 8 might become a hodge-podge 
of words. It would also seem somewhat illogical to tie the date of 
indorsement to the date of presentation for transfer-such dates might 
be two or more years apart. And is it proper to make something proof 
of a fact which is, on its face, not proof of the fact'? 
Another defect which appears in both clause (2) of s~ction 8-402 
of the code and the Wisconsin act, namely, the difficulty, if not impos-
sibility, of securing adequate proof that a person indorsing as trustee 
was the trustee at the date of signing, has also been discussed above. 
Indorsement by a partnership. A further defect, which does not 
appear in the Wisconsin statute, is that in the case of a transfer by a 
partnership the code requires proof that the indorser was a partner at 
the date of signing. Although theoretically necessary for protection; 
no such proof is now generally required by transfer agents, so that the 
code, in this case, imposes an additional burden on the transfer of stock. 
Inasmuch as a great deal of stock is registered in the names of brokerage 
and nominee partnerships, this burden would be a very real one. And 
what would such proof be'? The original partnership articles would be 
proof that the indorser was a partner at the time the partnership was 
created, but the only proof that he was a partner at the date of signing 
would be either a statement to that effect by all of the partners or a self-
serving declaration by the indorsing partner. It may be said that a 
transfer agent could ignore this requirement for a partnership transfer 
and follow the current practice. But suppose it does and it turns out 
that the indorser was not a partner at the date of signing, and the part-
nership claims a wrongful transfer. The transfer agent would look to 
the signature guarantor to make good, but, obviously, the guarantor is 
going to claim a discharge of his obligation because the transfer agent 
did not follow the code standard of care, and it may well be that his 
claim would be successful. 
Indorsement by a corporation. One other defect in clause (2) of 
section 8-402 is that the indorsement of any officer is sufficient for a 
transfer of stock in the name of a corporation.30 This is a drastic de-
parture from the established legal practice, which prevails not only in 
the transfer of stock but in all other transactions by a corporation, that 
the authority of the officer must be supported by a by-law provision or 
30 Supplement No. I to the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes this defect and 
amends the clause to require, also, evidence of the power of the signing officer. 
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by a resolution of the board of directors. A transfer by an unauthorized 
officer is not a breach of trust-it is a void transfer just the same as a 
forged indorsement. There is grave doubt that any statute can confer 
authority where authority does not exist, except possibly a general stat-
ute as part of the corporation law that any officer of a corporation shall 
have authority to bind the corporation. In view of the fact that many 
banks and corporations have scores of officers with limited authority, 
no such broad statute would be proper. 
Court orders. A further defect in clause 2 of section 8-402 is that 
a transfer agent is not permitted by the code to require a court order for 
a transfer of stock by an executor, administrator or guardian even 
though the law of the state from which such a fiduciary derives his 
authority requires a court order and makes any transfer without a court 
order void. Here, again, the question may be raised as to whether a 
statute at the domicile of the corporation can make such a void transfer 
a valid one. 
Guarantee of signature. The third clause of section 8-402 defines 
a signature guarantee for the purpose of the section. A signature guar-
antee is defined to mean a guarantee signed by or on behalf of a person 
reasonably believed by the transfer agent to be responsible. This de-
stroys the right of the transfer agent to decide for itself, without the 
risk of its decision being questioned, whose guaranty it is willing to 
accept, and is a distinct step backward from the standpoint of the 
transfer agent. 
This brings up some other provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code relating to signature guarantees. These provisions are contained 
in section 8-312. They define the responsibility of a signature guaran-
tor and set up two forms of guarantee. The first is a guarantee of sig-
nature which is defined to mean that the signature is not forged, that 
the signer is the holder or has authority to sign in the name of the 
holder, and that the signer has legal capacity to sign. It is expressly 
provided that the guarantee of signature is not a warranty of the right-
fulness of the transfer. The second form is a guarantee of indorsement, 
which is not only a guarantee of signature but also a warranty of right-
fulness. But the transfer agent is expressly forbidden to require a 
guarantee of indorsement as a condition to a transfer of stock. 
No reason for setting up two distinct forms of guarantee is appar-
ent. It has been well established by the Jennie Clarkson Home case 
that the form of guarantee now used universally covers not only a 
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forgery, but also the authority and capacity of the indorser.31 The ques-
tion of whether it covers rightfulness of the transfer has never been 
decided, but it would follow from the reasoning of the court in the 
Clarkson Home case that it should. The court's reasoning was that the 
guarantor is in a much better position to verify the capacity and author-
ity of the indorser than the transfer agent. It would appear, therefore, 
that these provisions of the code represent a further backward step from 
the point of view of a transfer agent. From the practical standpoint, 
the wording of the code would seem also to eliminate reliance on the 
mere signature of a broker under the indorsement as a guarantee of 
signature. 
As a matter of fact, the subject of signature guarantees really has 
no place in an exoneration statute if the signature guarantee is intended 
to replace other proof of the rightfulness of the transfer. A signature 
guarantee does not make rightful something which may be wrongful. 
It is only a practical safeguard to the transfer agent, just as an indorse-
ment on a note is only a practical safeguard to the payee, and is always 
subject to the risk that the guarantor may go bankrupt or go out of 
business or that the statute of limitations may run out before the guar-
antee is invoked. 
The idea of injecting the signature guarantee into an exoneration 
statute has stirred up the conflict between bankers and brokers on the 
one hand and transfer agents on the other hand as to the meaning of 
the signature guarantee. The tendency is to put less responsibility on 
the guarantor, possibly because the bankers and brokers are more 
numerous and more vociferous than the transfer agents. In my opinion 
this is wrong. No responsible banker or broker will guarantee the sig-
nature of a stranger-the person requesting a guarantee must either 
be a customer, which is generally the case, or some one introduced by 
a customer. The banker or broker is, therefore, in a much better posi-
tion to evaluate the honesty of the indorser than is the transfer agent, 
to whom the indorser is a stranger. Furthermore, although the banker 
or broker may derive no direct pecuniary benefit from guaranteeing a 
signature, he does derive an indirect pecuniary benefit in providing a 
service for his customer. A banker or broker who declined to guarantee 
his customers' signatures would lose a lot of customers. Compared to 
this, the professional transfer agent derives no pecuniary benefit from 
transferring the stock other than the fee paid by the corporation, which 
fee is the same for fiduciary transfers and individual transfers and 
s1 Jennie Clarkson Home v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E. 571 (1905). 
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allows no margin for taking any risks.32 And the corporation which 
transfers its own stock makes no money out of its stock transfer 
department. 
Duty to inquire. Section 8-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
deals with the duty of the transfer agent to inquire into the rightfulness 
of a transfer of stock. It provides that, where the certificate is fully 
indorsed for transfer, the transfer agent need not make any inquiry 
unless it has notice of another claim to an interest in the stock. Notice 
that the registered owner holds the stock for a third person or that the 
stock is registered in the name of a fiduciary does not create a duty of 
inquiry. Inquiry must be made, however, if the transfer is to a fidu-
ciary in his individual capacity, or if the transfer agent has notice that 
the proceeds of a sale of the stock have been placed in the individual 
account of the fiduciary or are made payable in cash or to the fiduciary 
individually, or otherwise has reason to know that the transfer is for 
the individual benefit of the fiduciary. 
An obvious unfavorable comment on section 8-403 can be made 
by the large banks and trust companies which maintain stock transfer 
departments. If they are to be protected by the code in the case of 
transfers of stock by fiduciaries by way of sale, they would have to 
inquire of their banking and other departments as to whether such 
departments have any knowledge of the transfer or the disposition of 
the proceeds. Although the code contains a definition of notice to an 
organization in section 1-201 (27), it is not clear that the transfer 
department would be relieved of the duty of inquiry in this case. 
Replacing missing certificates. Some other provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code which are unfavorable to transfer agents might 
be mentioned. Under the wording of section 8-404 a situation may 
arise where a transfer agent may be forced to issue a new certificate in 
place of a lost or stolen certificate without an indemnity bond. 
Section 8-405 modifies the existing law relating to lost certificates. 
If, after the issue of a new certificate in place of a lost one, the lost 
certificate is presented by a bona fide purchaser, the transfer agent must 
register the transfer and then chase the holder of the new certificate 
or his transferee to try to get it back. The transfer agent cannot call 
on the original holder or the surety on the indemnity bond until it is 
apparent after reasonable investigation that the new certificate cannot 
32 Some professional transfer agents make a charge of $2 or $3 for fiduciary transfers. 
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be recovered. 33 This changes the present practice of immediately calling 
on the surety to make good without making any investigation.34 Also, 
the code validates the lost certificate and outlaws the new certificate, 
which is contrary to the view at common law and under other statutes.35 
Liability of transfer agents. Section 8-406, which defines the lia-
bility of professional transfer agents and registrars, provides that such 
liability shall be the same as that of the corporation. This would seem 
to make the professional transfer agent liable for a refusal to transfer 
stock, which is not the case at common law.36 
There are other sections of the Uniform Commercial Code relating 
to the transfer of stock which, also, have been the subject of some 
criticism. I have, however, confined my comments to the sections which 
relate directly to the responsibilities of the transfer agent. 
The foregoing comments on the Uniform Commercial Code indi-
cate that, at the very least, article 8 needs rather drastic amendment. It 
would seem better, however, to reject article 8 completely rather than 
permit each state legislature to tinker with it and thereby destroy _the 
vital element of uniformity. 
Now, as a preliminary to considering what form an ideal exonera-
tion statute should take, let us examine the most frequently occurring 
types of fiduciary transfers. In doing this, we should keep in mind the 
distinction between wrongful transfers and transfers in breach of trust. 
We should also keep in mind that what we are trying to accomplish is 
the simplification of stock transfers with adequate protection to the 
transfer agent. We are not trying to codify the complete law relating 
to the subject. 
I. Transfer of stock in the name of a decedent on the indorse-
ment of an executor or administrator. This may be a transfer to the 
name of the executor or administrator as such, to the name of an indi-
vidual, partnership, or corporation who may be either a purchaser or 
a legatee or a nominee, to the name of a trustee under the will, or to 
the name of a guardian for an individual. Regardless of the character 
of the transferee, the transfer agent must protect itself against a wrong-
ful transfer by securing evidence that the indorser is the executor or 
administrator of the estate of the decedent. This is no more than is 
83 Supplement No. I to the Uniform Commercial Code removes the requirement for 
such investigation. 
84 See CHRISTY .AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF SToCK, 2d ed., §278 (1940). 
85 See cases and statutes cited in CHRISTY .AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 
2d ed., §§272 and 274 (1940; Supp. 1954). 
36 See cases cited in CHRISTY .AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., §281 
(1940). 
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required by anyone dealing with an executor or administrator. Perfect 
evidence would be a surrogate's certificate dated as of the date of 
indorsement and delivery of the stock, but this is impracticable. There 
is some doubt that any statutory definition of proof short of this (such 
as a statement that a surrogate's certificate dated within a certain time 
before transfer would constitute such proof) would be valid. 
The present practice is for the transfer agent to require a surrogate's 
certificate dated within a reasonable time prior to the transfer and to 
take the risk that the executor or administrator may have been removed 
.or discharged prior to the time of indorsement and delivery. Such risk 
is insured by the signature guarantee, which is required in all cases. If 
the signature guarantor is unable to pay up, the transfer agent can 
resort to its own insurance. The transfer agent must also require a 
court order where a transfer without such an order is void. These 
requirements, which are customary and are not onerous, reasonably 
protect the transfer agent against a wrongful transfer, and no statute 
is necessary either to simplify such transfers or to exonerate the transfer 
agent. But a statute is necessary for both reasons insofar as the transfer 
by the executor or administrator might constitute a breach of trust. 
Such a statute should do away with the necessity of inquiring as to the 
nature of the transfer or the character of the transferee and of examin-
ing the will or any other records and of securing any additional docu-
ments except, of course, a tax waiver where necessary. 
2. Transfer of stock registered in the name of an executor or 
administrator on the indorsement of the executor or administrator. 
There are two points to be considered in such a transfer. The first 
is whether the executor or administrator may have been removed and a 
new executor or administrator appointed. If such is the case is the 
transfer by the removed executor or administrator wrongful and void? 
The answer would seem to be that it is not-the executor or admin-
istrator in whose name the stock is registered has the right and is under 
the duty, after his removal, to transfer the stock to his successor, and 
if he makes any other transfer it is only a transfer in breach of trust 
which is voidable by his successor. Ownership of the registered holder 
of stock is presumed to continue until notice to the contrary, and the 
transfer agent should be under no affirmative duty to inquire as to 
whether the registered holder is still acting as executor or adminis-
trator. In this respect, there is a difference between the case where 
the stock is registered in the name of the decedent and the case where 
it is registered in the name of the executor or administrator. 
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The second point is whether the executor or administrator in whose 
name the stock is registered is committing a breach of trust in making 
the transfer. In this respect, the case is the same as where the stock is 
registered in the name of the decedent. To make it possible, however, 
for a transfer agent to permit a transfer without requiring evidence of 
the appointment of the executor or administrator and without making 
inquiry as to the nature of the transfer or the character of the transferee, 
a proper exoneration statute is essential. If such a statute were appli-
cable, the only requirements for transfer would be a signature guaran-
tee and a court order where a transfer without court order would be 
void. 
3. Transfer of stock registered in the name of a testamentary or 
inter vivas trustee on the indorsement of the trustee. Such transfers 
are generally in the form of a transfer to an individual, partnership or 
corporation who may be either a purchaser or a beneficiary or a nomi-
nee. This is like the case of a transfer of stock registered in the name of 
an executor or administrator, and no wrongful transfer is involved. The 
question is one entirely of possible breach of trust. If there were a stat-
ute eliminating any duty to inquire as to the nature of the transfer or 
the character of the transferee and to examine the trust instrument, the 
transfer could be made on the indorsement of the trustee with a signa-
ture guarantee, and no more. 
4. Transfer of stock in the name of a minor. Such a transfer may 
be on the indorsement of the minor himself or on the indorsement of 
a guardian. In the former case, there is some existing law protecting 
the transfer agent against any subsequent avoidance of the transfer 
even if it had knowledge that the indorser was a minor. There is room, 
however, for a statute authorizing a transfer of stock by a minor similar 
to the New York Banking Law37 which authorizes a bank to honor 
checks drawn by a minor. Although the New York General Corpora-
tion Law38 allows corporations to pay dividends to minors and to permit 
them to vote, it does not go so far as to authorize a transfer by a minor 
of his stock. The New York Stock Exchange has taken the lead in 
advocating a statute which would permit the registration of stock in the 
name of a custodian for a minor, without court proceedings to appoint 
the custodian the guardian of the minor. This would allow parents to 
invest in stock for the benefit of their children as they now open sav-
87N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1950) §134.1. 
SSN.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1954) §12-a. 
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ings bank accounts for their benefit. Such a statute has merit but it 
should not be made part of a uniform exoneration act. In the other 
case, namely, a transfer of the minor's stock on the indorsement of a 
guardian, the same considerations apply as in the case of a transfer of 
a decedent's stock by an executor or administrator. 
5. Transfer of stock registered in the name of a guardian of a 
minor or incompetent on the indorsement of the guardian. The same 
situation exists here as in the case of stock registered in the name of an 
executor or administrator. 
6. Transfer of stock registered in the name of a corporation on the 
indorsement of an officer. Here the transfer is wrongful unless the 
indorsing officer has authority to transfer the stock for the corporation, 
and to protect itself the transfer agent must have proof of such author-
ity. This proof is the standard proof required by everyone transacting 
business with a corporation-a certified extract from the by-laws or a 
certified resolution of the board of directors. No statute should or could 
properly eliminate this requirement. 
7. Transfer of stock registered in the name of a partnership on 
the indorsement of one of the partners. If the person indorsing the 
certificate was not a partner, then the transfer is void, as the indorse-
ment, in effect, is a forgery. To try to get proof that the indorser was 
a partner at the time of indorsement and delivery in every case of a 
partnership transfer is so impracticable that, years ago, transfer agents 
gave up and adopted the practice of relying solely on the signature 
guarantee. The difficulty of trying to cover this situation by statute, 
as in the Uniform Commercial Code, has been mentioned above. The 
transfer requirement of a mere partnership indorsement and a signa-
ture guarantee cannot be simplified any further, and, as long as trans-
fer agents are willing to rely on the signature guarantee in such cases, no 
statute is necessary or desirable. 
8. Transfer of stock registered in the name of a principal on the 
indorsement of an agent. Here, also, the primary risk is that the in-
dorser was not the agent at the time of indorsement and delivery, 
either because the principal had died or had revoked the power of 
attorney. If such is the case, it is a wrongful transfer and void. The 
original power of attorney, plus proof that the principal was alive and 
that the power of attorney was in effect at the time of indorsement and 
delivery, is the only proper support for a transfer by an agent, and a 
statute could not very well authorize less proof. Under the present 
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practice, transfer agents do not require such stiff proof, and rely largely 
on a certification by a bank or on the signature guarantee. 
9. Transfer of stock on the indorsement of a fiduciary to the indi-
vidual name of the fiduciary. There is no question here of wrongful 
transfer-at the most such a transfer may be a breach of trust if the 
fiduciary is acting improperly. In view of the widespread practice, now 
supported by statute in thirty-four states and territories and by specific 
provisions in most trust instruments, of registering fiduciary stock in 
the name of a nominee there is little occasion for a transfer to the indi-
vidual name of a fiduciary. No fiduciary who wants to defraud his 
estate is going to transfer stock to his individual name when he can 
transfer it to a purchaser and pocket the proceeds or transfer it to a 
nominee. Nevertheless, the Uniform Commercial Code (sec. 8-403) 
imposes a duty on the transfer agent to inquire when a fiduciary pre-
sents stock for transfer to his individual name. There should be no 
such duty. 
Objectives for an Exoneration Statute 
The foregoing examples give an idea of the purpose to be accom-
plished by a proper exoneration statute. The purpose should be to do 
away with the duty of the transfer agent to make inquiry as to whether 
a :fiduciary is committing a breach of trust, and the statute should exon-
erate the transfer agent from liability to the beneficial owner if, in fact, 
the transfer was a breach of trust by the fiduciary. This would elimi-
nate the annoyances, delays and hardships involved in the transfer of 
stock which are the basis of complaints by fiduciaries. This should be 
the sole purpose of the statute, and all other provisions relating to 
wrongful transfers, which are of doubtful legality, signature guarantees, 
and other matters should be discarded. 
What form should an exoneration statute take? In my opinion, 
the requisites for a workable statute are as follows: 
I. It should be simple and short so that it can be well understood 
and easily applied. Most of the statutes on the subject are too long 
and involved. The English statute-is contained in one short sentence. 
2. It should be confined to the one purpose mentioned above. 
3. It should not be a mandatory statute. 
4. It should avoid provocative provisions which lead to arguments 
among lawyers, legislators, transfer agents, banks and brokers when it 
is considered for legislative enactment, which, in turn, would lead to 
different amendments in different states, thereby destroying the most 
1955] TRANSFER OF STOCK 723 
important factor of all, namely, uniformity. In this respect, the Uni-
form Commercial Code is a fine example of what an exoneration statute 
should not be. 
5. To insure widespread adoption, it should be patterned on a 
statute already familiar to the legislatures of as many states as possible. 
For instance, the adoption of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act or of statutes 
similar to section 3 of that act.in thirty jurisdictions means that more 
than half of the legislatures have accepted the policy of simplifying fidu-
ciary transfers, at least to the extent provided in the act. Also, the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act which deals with transfers of stock be-
tween transferors and transferees, has received the unanimous approval 
of the legislatures of all the states (although the Uniform Commercial 
Code would supersede it). Would it not be far easier to persuade those 
legislatures to adopt a simple amendment to one of these acts than to 
persuade them to adopt a brand new statute, particularly a statute of the 
type of the Uniform Commercial Code? 
The Committee on Simplification of Stock Transfers by Fiduciaries 
of the American Bar Association has had under consideration a pro-
posed Model Exoneration Act, but the members of the committee are, 
by no means, in accord as to the form of such act or, indeed, as to the 
form of any statute so far devised or suggested for the purpose. I 
believe, however, that the Model Act is far better than the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and that, with some skillful surgery, it can come 
as close as humanly possible to being a workable and acceptable statute. 
I believe that the laudable movement to simplify stock transfers is 
doomed to failure unless a statute is devised which will define the 
responsibility of a transfer agent in a uniform and practical manner 
and which will be accepted for widespread adoption by the state leg-
islatures. The great bulk of stock transfers is handled by professional 
transfer agents. The stock transfer department of a large bank or trust 
company may transfer hundreds of thousands of shares in one day. It 
may act as transfer agent for hundreds of corporations domiciled in 
twenty or thirty or more different states. The only way to keep the 
transfers rolling is to have a single understandable procedure to be fol-
lowed by the transfer clerks. The present variation among the several 
states in respect of tax waiver and court order statutes makes fiduciary 
transfers difficult enough for the professional transfer agents. To pile 
on top of this exoneration statutes of varying and uncertain wording 
would just increase the difficulty. From another point of view, many 
large corporations have separate transfer offices or transfer agents in 
three or more different states. This situation presents problems of 
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notice or knowledge chargeable to the corporation and problems of 
conllicting laws. Any exoneration statute, to be workable, must be 
geared to the conditions under which the professional transfer agents 
and the large corporations necessarily work. In other words, make it 
short, make it simple, and above all, make it uniform. 
